(USASABAH)
İsmihan Yılmaz / Washington DC
As Turkey goes to polls on Sunday June 12, to elect a new government - the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, we talked to one of the most prominent Turkey experts in The U.S. on what the political landscape in Turkey will look like after the elections and implications for Turkey-EU and the Turkish-US relations.
F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation.
From 1978 to 1981, Larrabee served on the U.S. National Security Council staff in the White House as a specialist on Soviet–East European affairs and East-West political-military relations.
Larrabee's recent RAND monographs on Turkey include Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change (2010); Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner (2008); The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (with Angel Rabasa, 2008)
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You have been following Turkish politics for a long time. How do you see the Turkish political arena right before the elections?
This is obviously a very important election, but the question is not whether the AKP will win it or not. Because it is clear that the AKP will win the most votes. The real question is that whether the AKP can obtain a super-majority, which would allow it to pass legislation – and amend the constitution – without regard to the views of other parties. In short, is Erdogan going to take all political views into consideration as he attempts to re-write the constitution after the elections or just those of the AKP?
What would be your prediction about the percentage?
Upper 40's. 47-48 % for the AKP but probably not enough seats for a supermajority.
What are the challenges do you think the AKP government will be facing aftermath of the elections?
I think the main issue the AKP will face is the Kurdish issue. It seems to me that Erdogan has focused on getting the nationalist votes rather than Kurdish votes.
I think he is calculating that if he can attract a large number the MHP's votes, the MHP may not get enough votes to cross the 10% threshold needed to be represented in parliament. If the MHP is not represented in parliament, the AKP would have a strong chance of obtaining a supermajority, enabling the party to govern without concern for the views of the other parties.
Do you think the AKP is genuine in its intention to solve the Kurdish issue?
Yes, I think they are. There have been significant changes in education and broadcasting but the AKP couldn't follow up on all of the promises they made. There are many reasons for that. I think they mishandled the amnesty issue for the PKK guerillas in October 2009. The strong adverse reaction of many Turks to the PKK guerillas being greeted as heroes by some of the Kurds forced the AKP to put the Kurdish opening on hold. So, I think the AKP took some positive steps, but not nearly enough to seriously resolve the issue.
Some suggest that think a CHP-MHP coalition would be better for Turkey? What's your take?
The two parties have important differences toward number of critical issues. Therefore, I don't think a coalition between them would be able to deal effectively with Turkey's problems.
In a recent article you said "Turkish transition to presidential system would make sense in some ways". What do you mean by that?
What I meant by that is as future presidents will be elected by popular vote after current President Abudallah Gul's term is over, so a switch to a presidential system would have a certain logic. But a shift to a presidential system would be likely to stoke fears among secularists that there would not be sufficient checks and balances on the power of the president. Therefore any attempt by Erdogan to move toward this type of presidential system is likely to be highly controversial and could increase the current political polarization in Turkey. I think this is the reason Gul isn't in favor of it.
Do you think these concerns over authoritarianism have a real ground?
Yes and no. No, because I don't think the AKP is an authoritarian party. But the prime minister himself has shown some authoritarian tendencies. The way he responds to criticism rather dismissively and the recent arrest of a couple of journalists who had basically supported his position on the Ergenokon affair and the fines on the Dogan media enterprise have caused a lot of people to be concerned about the prime minister's understanding of freedom of the press. I don't want to put all the blame on Erdogan's shoulders. However, many Western observers are not certain whether Erdogan shares the same understanding of freedom of speech as the leaders of EU countries do.
Speaking of the EU, how do you think the elections will impact Turkey's path to getting membership to the EU?
Well, first I think it will depend on whether Erdogan makes a stronger push to pursue some of the reforms that the EU has identified as needed in its report last Autumn.
Secondly, popular opposition to Turkey's membership is growing in the EU. This has had an impact on Turkish public. As a result, public support in Turkey for EU membership has visibly decline -- from nearly 70 percent five years ago to about 35-40 percent today, depending on which poll you believe. This decline in public support is significant and it reflects increasing discontent with the treatment of Turkey by the EU. According to the a recent German Marshall Fund poll, most Europeans think Turkey will become a member of the EU but don't favor membership. The Turkish view is just the opposite: The Turks believe Turkey it would be good for Turkey to become a member but they don't and contradictory believe it will be admitted! So, you have two very different perspectives.
Let me make clear that from a strategic and political point of view, Turkey's membership to the EU is highly desirable and that is why the US, whether under a democratic or republican government, have strongly supported Turkish membership. Turkish membership would require adjustments in the short run but over the long run it would strengthen the EU. Turkey has the 17th largest economy in the world and the sixth largest economy in Europe. It has had an annual growth rate of over 7 percent for last 5-6 years at a time when a number of EU members are deeply in debt and on the verge bankruptcy. Turkish membership would also enable the EU to develop a more effective outreach to the Middle East and become a stronger international actor.
How do you assess the AKP's commitment to EU membership?
I think it is strong and could be stronger. It was stronger between 2001-2005 and they pushed a number of reforms very successfully. But right now, there is less domestic political pressure on Erdogan and the AKP to move forward very rapidly with a number of reforms, because being pro-EU brings few political benefits today in Turkey. But my impression is that the AKP definitely is still committed to obtaining EU membership, though it is somewhat less urgent a goal than it was a few years ago.
How about US-Turkish relations? What impact do you think Sunday's elections will have on the "troubled" relations?
First of all, US-Turkish relations are unlikely to dramatically change as a result of the elections. The relations between the two countries will remain strong. Many of the problems in US-Turkish relations in recent years were a consequence of the US invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration's initial failure to provide active support fro Turkey's struggle against PKK terrorism. If the US had not invaded Iraq and had supported Turkey's struggle with PKK more vigorously, relations today would be considerably better. In principle, the goals of the two countries are very similar. Both want a more stable and democratic Middle East. And they both want the change in this direction to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
At the same time, they both confront the same dilemma in dealing with the growing pressure for change in the region. In both cases, there is a clash between their values and their strategic interests in dealing with the Middle East. Turkey has strong economic interests in Libya. Hence Erdogan initially refrained from calling for Qaddafi to step down, as he did in the case of President Mubarak in Egypt. He had to balance concern for poltical and human rights with Turkey's economic interests. The US faces the same dilemma in its relation with Saudi Arabia. On one hand, the United States supports the calls for increased democratic reforms in the Middle East. On the other hand, it has strong economic interests in maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia, one of the least democratic regimes in the Middle East. In both cases, moral values conflict with strategic interests and it is hard to find the proper balance. Turkey and the US are facing the same difficulty.
How likely is it that the US will be supporting Turkey's efforts to solve the Kurdish issue?
The United States has supported the AKP's Kurdish Opening. The US also believes that the Kurdish issue cannot be solved by relying solely on military means. To be successful, a tough anti-terrorism policy must be combined with political, economic and social reforms designed to address the concerns of the Kurdish community.
